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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of corruption control and political stability on illicit financial 
outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa. We use a balanced panel data from the World Bank, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development and Global Financial Integrity on Sub-Saharan 
African countries covering the period 2005-2014. Our regression estimates reveal that a unit 
increase in political stability and corruption control reduce illicit financial outflow due to 
misinvoicing in merchandise trade by an average of US$ 20.5 million and US$ 44.3 million 
respectively. The results also show that high trade rating, financial sector rating and exchange rates 
reduce illicit financial outflows while increase in foreign direct investment and inflation increase 
illicit financial outflow. We recommend that governments in Sub-Saharan Africa countries must 
ensure that institutions responsible for fighting corruption and enhancing stable governance are 
well empowered and given the needed resources to work effectively to reduce corruption to the 
barest minimum.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Agenda 2063 was introduced by the African Union in 2015 to serve as a roadmap to a transformed 
African continent within the next 50 years. Prominently, the Agenda issues a call to action on a 
variety of issues on which prompt action needs to be taken if its vision is to be fulfilled. Among 
the points listed is the call to “….[s]strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, build continental 
capital markets and financial institutions, and reverse the illicit flows of capital from the 
continent…” (AU, 2015a:18) 
 
The focus on illicit capital flows is warranted, with Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimating in 
2013 that Africa is in fact a net creditor to the world, even after financial flows such as FDI, debt 
forgiveness and remittances have been taken into account. The African Union’s (2015b:13) high-
level panel on illicit financial flows found that illicit financial flows were costing the African 
continent $50 billion annually. Ndikumana (2017:2) shows that capital flight has reached 
particularly worrisome levels in the past decade, with S$511 billion being lost to capital flight 
between 2000 and 2010 as opposed to half that amount in the previous decade. These lost funds 
represent substantial opportunity cost for development efforts in Africa. Ndikumana (2014) shows 
that, between 2000 and 2010, if African countries had managed to retain capital lost to illicit flows 
and invest it in domestic economies, additional economic growth rates of as high as 3 per cent 
could have been achieved. 
 
Research into capital flight in Africa has focused on trying to understand its determinants and 
possible impacts. A special issue of the African Development Review (ADR) (2016) delves into 
these issues at length. This paper responds to the research presented in that issue and contributes 
to the debate by examining the effect of corruption control and political stability on illicit financial 
outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa. The importance of good institutions and political stability were 
highlighted throughout the ADR’s special issue as key drivers of capital flight in individual 
African countries (Geda & Yimer, 2016; Gankou, Bendoma & Sow, 2016; Ndiaye & Siri, 2016; 
Kwaramba, Mahonye & Mandishara, 2016). Mpenya, Metseyem & Epo (2016:88) and Kwaramba 
et al. (2016:62) found that trade misinvoicing especially in the natural resource sector is an 
important channel of capital flight. This article makes a specific contribution to the foundations of 
the debate by looking at trade misinvoicing and Leakages in Balance of Payment (BOP) as sources 
of illicit financial outflows.  
 
Whereas studies in the ADR focused on individual African countries, this article furthermore 
broadens the scope of the discourse through examining a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries 
and finds that the importance of political stability which was highlighted in several country level 
case studies holds at a continental level, too. It is found that a unit increase in political stability 
reduces capital flight in the form of merchandise trade misinvoicing by an average of $20.5 
million, while better corruption control reduces capital flight by an average of $44.3 million. In 
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contrast to Gankou et al.’s (2016:65) finding that there is no significant link between FDI inflows 
and illicit outflows, we do find that increased FDI increases illicit capital outflows. In the 
remainder of this paper, section 2 presents a brief literature review, followed by the research 
methodology in section 3 and a discussion of empirical results in section 4. Section 5 concludes 
and makes tentative policy suggestions. 
 
2. Brief literature review 
 
Though much analysis has been done on the developmental impacts of capital flight, the literature 
on specific determinants of capital flight is sparse. Here, a brief summary of prominent studies is 
given. However, before presenting discussing these studies, it is important to distinguish between 
capital flight and illicit financial flows as the two terms are constantly used in this article. Global 
Financial Integrity (2017) defines such flows as illicit if the funds crossing borders are illegally 
earned, transferred, and/or utilized. If the flow breaks a law at any point, it is considered illicit. 
The difference in the calculation of capital flight and illicit flows lies in the way in which balance 
of payments leakages are estimated given that flows due to deliberate trade misinvoicing are 
common to both. Illicit financial flows are different from capital flight in the sense that capital 
flight includes both licit and illicit capital (Kar & Spanjers, 2015). Licit capital flight is recorded 
and tracked, significantly lowering the probability that it has a corrupt or criminal source. In 
contrast, IFFs are by nature unrecorded, and cannot be used as public funds or private investment 
capital in their country of origin (Kar & Spanjers, 2014). In this brief review, the terms capital 
flight and illicit financial flows are used interchangeably due to their inseparable nature. More so, 
empirical studies on illicit financial flows in particularly developing country are very limited.       
  
 Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2014:37-39) provide a detailed overview of the issues relating to 
the measurement and drivers of capital flight. Their analysis of 39 African countries between 1970 
and 2010 show that capital flight is fuelled by external borrowing and corroborate Murinde, 
Ochieng and Qingwei’s (2014:15) finding that capital flight begets capital flight. Strong economic 
growth is shown to be a possible deterrent to capital flight. Other potential drivers of capital flight 
did not yield conclusive results, with no robust evidence that inflation, capital account openness, 
political regime or financial development drive capital flight (Ndikumana et el., 2016). The 
importance of institutional quality is highlighted once again, with results showing that even in 
natural resource rich countries, capital flight depends heavily on governance. 
 
Ndikumana and Sarr (2016:13) delve more deeply into the relationship between capital flight and 
FDI inflows in Africa by applying dynamic panel methods to 32 African countries between 1970 
and 2013. They do not find evidence that annual FDI inflows drive capital flight, though a positive 
relationship exists between FDI stocks and capital flight. The authors also find that natural resource 
endowments, especially oil, are positively related to capital flight and FDI stock. Institutional 
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quality is found to have an important ameliorating effect on capital flight. A recurring theme in 
the literature is the key role that Institutions play in combatting high levels of capital flight. 
 
The 2016 special issue of the ADR1 aims to fill the gap in literature by presenting eight country-
specific studies. The results vary according to country context though the importance of political 
stability and institutions are highlighted in various papers as key determinants of capital flight 
(Geda & Yimer, 2016; Gankou, Bendoma & Sow, 2016; Ndiaye & Siri, 2016; Kwaramba, 
Mahonye & Mandishara, 2016). Trade misinvoicing is found to be an important channel of capital 
flight (Ndikumana, 2016:2). The specific proxy of misinvoicing in a multi-country panel context 
has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature hence is the focus of the remainder of this 
study. The rest of the article commences with the methodology followed in our analysis. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data sources and variable measurement 
 
The empirical analyses of this paper is based on a balanced panel data built from three sources: 1) 
the World Bank, 2) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and 3) 
Global Financial Integrity (GFI).  The data from the World Bank were extracted from the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) and World Development Indicators (WDI). Variables extracted 
from the WGI are political stability and control of corruption. According the World Bank (2017), 
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Similarly, control 
of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests (World Bank, 2017). These variables are constructed from a list of individual 
variables from various data sources including the African Development Bank Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments, Afrobarometer, Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators 
and Global Integrity Index2.  
 
                                                          
1 Readers are referred to the full special edition for in-depth information on the literature and findings presented in 
case studies: Ndikumana, L. (ed) 2016. Supplement: AERC’s project on “Capital flight from Africa.”  African 
Development Review, 28(S1):1-123. 
2 Details of the methodological approaches for constructing the indicators and sources of data have been discussed by 
the World Bank and it is accessible on http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc. The data on 
inflation can be accessed from the World Bank database at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
while the data on FDI are accessible at the FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics). 
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From the WDI, the variables extracted for the analysis are exchange rate and inflation. According 
to the World Bank, inflation which is measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services 
that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. Similarly, exchange rate is 
calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages  captured in local currency units 
relative to the U.S. dollar (World Bank, 2017). Aside these variables, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows (measured in millions of dollars) were obtained from the UNCTAD interactive 
database for the countries and the period 2005 to 2014. The inclusion of these variables is to assess 
the effects of macrocosmic conditions and policies on illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (UNCTAD, 2017).   
 
In addition to these explanatory variables, we extracted the data on illicit financial flows (IFFs) for 
the respective years and countries from the database of the Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The 
Global Financial Integrity (2017) explains that the measures of illicit financial flows stem from 
two sources: (1) deliberate misinvoicing in merchandise trade (the source of GFI’s low and high 
estimates), and (2) leakages in the balance of payments (also known as “hot money flows”). 
However, comparing the two sources, trade misinvoicing is the primary measurable means by 
which organisations and individuals shift funds in and out of developing countries illicitly. The 
authors emphasis that using the lower estimates for trade misinvoicing alone produces  an average 
of 87 percent of illicit financial outflows due to fraudulent misinvoicing of trade (Global Financial 
Integrity, 2017). Apart from these explanations, we also observed that data on “hot money flows 
had many missing observations most of the countries. This contributed to a drop in the number of 
countries from 37 to 29 compared to the 37 for the indicator of misinvoicing in merchandise trade. 
This however, did not affect the intuition sign and level of significance of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
3.2 Empirical estimation strategy 
 
Since panel data was used for the analysis, we explored the appropriateness of both random and 
fixed effect models by conducting the Hausman post estimation test. The null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test is that individual effects are uncorrelated with any regressor in the model against the 
alternative hypothesis that individual effects are significantly correlated with at least one regressor 
in the mode (Hausman, 1978; Park, 2011).  The test suggested that the estimates of the random 
effect model must be preferred to those of the fixed effect. The effect random model is appropriate 
if there is enough reason to believe that differences across entities have some influence on the 
dependent variable(Torres-Reyna, 2007). As a result, we specify the random effect model as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼0 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                               (1) 
where 𝛼0 is the constant term,  𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the between entity error, and  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the within entity error. 
Similarly, 𝐵1 is the vector of the coefficients and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of the explanatory variables 
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including the variables of interest (control of corruption and political stability).  From equation 1, 
the empirical estimation model can be specified as: 
𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼0 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                     (2) 
𝛽1 < 0, 𝛽2 < 0, 𝛽3 < 0, 𝛽4 < 0, 𝛽5 > 0, 𝛽6 > 0 and  𝛽7 > 0 
 
In equation 2, 𝐼𝐹𝑂 represents illicit financial outflows, 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 represent corruption control, 
𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the political stability and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 represents trade rating of the country in question.  
In addition, 𝐹𝑆𝑅 is the financial sector rating, 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 and 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 are respectively, 
exchange rate and inflation (consumer price index). This paper is theoretically underpinned by the 
investment diversion theory which holds that capital flight is influenced by two sets of forces- 
macro economic and political uncertainty in developing countries and better investment 
opportunities in developed countries (Vukenkeng & Mukete, 2016). Vukenkeng and Mukete 
(2016) explains that the better investment opportunities in developed nations is the outcome of 
high interest rate, a variety of financial instruments, political and economic stability, the nature of 
the tax policy and the keeping of secret accounts. These two sets of conditions serve as motivation 
factors for investors to move their investment or resources mostly illegally from less developed 
countries to advanced countries. Political instability and poor governance contribute to a domestic 
environment that deters investment and induces capital flight (Le & Rishi, 2006). Based on this 
theoretical perspective, we expect corruption control and political stability to have negative 
association with illicit financial outflows. High rating of a country’s political stability should 
significantly reduce illicit financial outflows.  
 
The World Bank (2005) assert that in many developing economies, corruption works as a 
regressive tax which leads instances where the poor pay a disproportionate share of their income 
in the form of bribes to secure access to public services. Corruption has contributed to the failure 
of many aid-funded projects and it has the potential to weaken younger democracies (Kaufmann, 
2003). Extant studies suggest that bribes and official extortion act as an extra tax which deter 
potential foreign direct investment into developing countries. Corruption also contributes to 
macroeconomic vulnerability and lower economic growth (Wei, 2002; Wei & Wu, 2002). We 
therefore expect a negative relationship between corruption control and illicit financial outflow. 
 
In addition to these variables, we expect that macroeconomic indicators such as high trade rating 
and financial sector rating to have negative association with illicit financial outflows since 
improvement in these variables are signs of robust institutional policies. On the basis of theoretical 
predictions and empirical findings, we expect that high inflation rate and increase in FDI should 
be associated with increase in illicit financial outflows. Extent literature on exchange rate capital-
flight nexus suggests an element of reverse causality which makes a priori prediction of its effect 
on illicit financial outflows difficult and dependent on country specific context (Uguru, Ozor, & 
Nkwagu, 2014). Country specific evidence in Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia shows that 
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expected currency depreciation and appreciation have been major drivers of capital flight (Mbewe, 
2015). We therefore expect that stronger exchange rate (appreciation of the local currency) should 
be associated with lower illicit financial outflows while weaker exchange rate (depreciation of the 
local currency) will be associated with high illicit financial outflows. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
As a starting point of the analysis, we present the results of a brief description of the trend of illicit 
outflows from the two sources (misinvoicing of trade in merchandise and leakages in balance of 
payment) and the explanatory variables of interest (control of corruption and political stability). 
The averages of the 10 percent high and 10 percent low for the two sources (misinvoicing in 
merchandise trade and leakages in balance of payment) of illicit financial outflows are presented 
in Table A2 at the appendix. The results show that across countries, illicit outflows are very high 
in countries such as Niger, Sudan, Sierra Leon and Nigeria but very low in Central African 
Republic, Eretria, and Guinea Bissau. Figure 1 depict that illicit financial outflows increased from 
2004 to 2008 before decreasing between 2008 and 2010. However, from 2010 to 2014, the trend 
was alternating between the years. The upper estimates Illicit financial outflows (10 percent high) 
peaked to as high as US$ 1890 million on average in 2008 but reduced to the lowest (US$1100) 
in 2012. Although illicit financial outflow due to misinvoicing of merchandise trade has reduced 
since 2013, it still remains high at an average of about US$ 900 million in 2014. It can be observed 
that illicit outflows due to leakages in the balance of payment follow the trend as the misinvoicing 
of trade in merchandise trade. The Figure generally shows that between 2006 and 2009, illicit 
financial outflows increased when ranking of corruption control and political stability were low. 
Similar phenomenon was observed between 2011 and 2014. 
 
Figure 1: Misinvoicing in merchandise trade, political stability and corruption control 
 
Source: Prepared by authors using data from World Bank and Global Financial Integrity 
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Across countries, Table A2 at the appendix shows that Nigeria recorded the highest average 
amount of illicit financial outflows (US$ 17855.95 million), followed by Sudan (US$ 8905.085 
million), Ethiopia (US$ 2205.775 million) while Benin (US$ 180.8223 million), Comoros (US$ 
44.2375 million), and Central African Republic (US$ 29.7536 million) are among the countries 
that experienced the lowest amount of illicit financial outflows from 2005 to 2014. Figure 2 further 
shows that people’s perception of corruption control and political stability in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have waned since 2011 and the trend was very pronounced in 2013. People’s perception of political 
stability was high in 2006 but very low in 2014. Similarly, perception of corruption control was 
high in 2007 and 2011 after which there has been a downward trend. Observe that there is an 
element of association between corruption control, political stability and financial outflows. What 
is very conspicuous from the Figure is that at high levels of people’s perception of corruption 
control and political stability, illicit financial outflows are low. This is particularly the case 
between 2007 and 2009 as well as 2011 and 2013.  
 
Figure 2: Control of corruption and misinvoicing in merchandise trade by country 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors using data World Bank and Global Financial Integrity 
 
In addition to the trend analysis, we present bivariate regression results in Figures 2 and 3 taking 
into consideration the countries. In Figure 2, there is negative relationship between people’s 
perception of corruption control and illicit financial outflows although there are some countries 
such as Central African Republic, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Carbo Verde, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Mozambique and Ghana that appear to be outliers. This means that if indeed corruption has any 
implications for illicit financial outflows, the governments of these countries would have to work 
to reduce corruption and maintain the confidence of their citizens. In Figure 3, a similar negative 
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relationship is observed between political stability3 and illicit it financial outflows. The countries 
appear to be outliers in the Figure 2 also appear to be outliers in Figure 3.  This brief descriptive 
analyses have shown that high levels of corruption control and political stability have negative 
association with illicit financial outflows. However, we did control for the effects of other variables 
on illicit financial outflows and those variables influence the effect of political stability and control 
of corruption4 on illicit financial outflows. The next section presents and discusses the results of 
the multivariate regression with regular references to the existing literature.  
 
Figure 3: Political stability and misinvoicing in merchandise trade by country 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors using data World Bank and Global Financial Integrity 
 
 
4.1 Regression estimates 
 
In order to ascertain the reliability of the regression estimates, we present results of the Hausman 
post estimation tests for the choice between the fixed effects and random effects estimates at the 
bottom of each Table of the regression outputs. The null hypothesis is that the preferred model is 
random effects versus the alternative that the fixed effects are preferred to the random effects 
                                                          
3 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.  Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all 
countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile 
ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the composition of the countries covered by the WGI. 
4 Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.  Percentile 
rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to 
lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.  Percentile ranks have been adjusted to correct for changes over time in the 
composition of the countries covered by the World Governance Indicators (WGI). 
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(Greene, 2008). The null hypothesis tests whether the unique errors terms are correlated with the 
regressors (Torres-Reyna, 2007). The results in all the three Tables show that the random effect 
estimates must be preferred to those of the fixed effect since the probability values of the Hausman 
tests are insignificant.  However, we present the models of both fixed effect and random effect as 
well as the transformed and untransformed dependent variables for comparison purposes. It is also 
important to note that the dependent variables for the results presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are 
respectively 10 percent high of illicit financial outflows, 10 percent low of illicit financial outflows 
and the average of the two.  
 
Table 1: Estimates of illicit financial outflows (10 percent high)   
Dependent variable Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effect Random effect 
(Misinvoicing in trade) (US$ mil) (log) (US$ mil) (log) 
Corruption control -36.54** -0.0151** -35.83** -0.0151*** 
 (15.91) (0.00585) (15.71) (0.00577) 
Political stability -53.72*** -0.0131** -52.79*** -0.0127** 
 (16.18) (0.00595) (16.00) (0.00587) 
Trade rating -571.4 -0.153 -611.8* -0.155 
 (368.1) (0.135) (363.8) (0.133) 
Financial sector rating -4.145 0.000284 -4.102 -0.000492 
 (13.02) (0.00478) (12.73) (0.00467) 
Foreign direct investment 737.7*** 0.335*** 687.8*** 0.332*** 
 (124.7) (0.0458) (116.6) (0.0428) 
Exchange rate -513.0*** -0.133*** -526.9*** -0.132*** 
 (104.1) (0.0382) (102.1) (0.0375) 
Inflation (CPI) 214.9 0.142* 283.4 0.142* 
 (212.8) (0.0782) (202.0) (0.0741) 
Constant 4,897*** 6.015*** 5,216*** 6.026*** 
 (1,629) (0.599) (1,578) (0.579) 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
R-squared 0.321 0.314 0.3143 0.3139 
Wald chi2(1) ---- ---- 134.74 134.50 
Prob > chi2 ---- ---- 0.000 0.000 
Hausman test ---- ---- 2.05 0.93 
Prob>chi2 ---- ---- 0.9572 0.9959 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Table1 (regression estimates of 10 percent high of outflows), it can be seen that at 1 percent 
level of significance, 1 percent increase in the corruption control score of a country reduces illicit 
financial outflows by about 1.5 percent which is equivalent to about US$ 36 million. Similarly, a 
unit increase in the political stability score of a country reduces illicit financial outflows by about 
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1.3 percent which also translate into an amount of US$ 53 million. Table 2 shows an insignificant 
effect of corruption control on 10 percent low of illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa 
although the intuition signs are correctly observed. With respect to political stability, the results 
depict that at 1 percent level of significance, an increase in a country’s score of its political stability 
by 1 percent is associated with a reduction in illicit financial outflows by about 1.6 percent (US$ 
36 million). 
 
The effects of political stability and corruption control on the average 10 percent high and 10 
percent low of illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 3) are 1.25 percent (US$ 
20.48 million) and 1.29 percent (US$ 44.26 million) respectively. These results corroborate the 
findings of earlier study conducted by Mossadak and Lahlou (2013) who concluded that good 
governance (measured by corruption control and political stability) in the public sector could 
reduce the illicit capital flight in the MENA region. The authors’ asserted that these variables 
reinforce the confidence of economic agents in the national economic and financial system. It is 
therefore evident from the results of the present study and existing literature that the effort to 
address the issue of illicit financial flows from Sub-Saharan Africa require sustained politically 
stable environment and low level of corruption.  
 
Aside political stability and corruption control, we assess the effects of other control variables on 
illicit financial outflows. Reports of the Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and UN regional 
economic commissions, including the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) suggest that there is 
close relationship between illicit financial flows and trade of developing countries (Global 
Financial Integrity, 2017; United Nations, 2017). As a result, trade rating5 of the countries was 
included the models as a control variable. The results in Table 1 shows that improvement in the 
rating of a country by 1 percent reduces illicit outflows (10 percent high) by 15.5 percent (US$ 
611.8 million). The corresponding reduction for the 10 percent low (see Table 2) and average of 
10 percent high and 10 percent low (Table 3) of outflows are respectively 28.5 percent (US$ 231.7 
million) and 20.0 percent (US$ 421.8 million). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Trade rating assesses how the policy framework fosters trade in goods on a scale of (1=low to 6=high). The data on 
trade rating were obtained from the World Bank Group, CPIA database (http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
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Table 2: Estimates of illicit financial outflows (10 percent low) 
Dependent variable Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effect Random effect  
(Misinvoicing trade) (US$ mil) (log) (US$ mil) (log) 
Corruption control -4.602 -0.00408 -5.123 -0.00422 
 (12.69) (0.00515) (12.57) (0.00512) 
Political stability -36.71*** -0.0160*** -35.74*** -0.0155*** 
 (12.91) (0.00524) (12.80) (0.00521) 
Trade rating -192.2 -0.273** -231.7 -0.285** 
 (293.6) (0.119) (291.1) (0.118) 
Financial sector rating 0.374 -0.000963 -1.189 -0.00202 
 (10.38) (0.00421) (10.19) (0.00415) 
Foreign direct investment 563.0*** 0.374*** 497.7*** 0.355*** 
 (99.42) (0.0404) (93.31) (0.0380) 
Exchange rate -134.7 -0.0767** -152.9* -0.0799** 
 (82.99) (0.0337) (81.70) (0.0332) 
Inflation rate (CPI) 56.07 0.113 119.2 0.132** 
 (169.7) (0.0689) (161.6) (0.0658) 
Constant 370.5 5.013*** 847.4 5.134*** 
 (1,300) (0.527) (1,263) (0.514) 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
R-squared 0.190 0.366 0.1775 0.3577 
Wald chi2(1) ---- ---- 63.44 163.75 
Prob > chi2 ---- ---- 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test ---- ---- 4.12 4.61 
Prob > chi2 ---- ---- 0.7655 0.7069 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The extent of development of the financial sector of the respective countries is expected to have 
significant influence on illicit financial outflows (Geda & Yimer, 2016).  A well-developed 
financial sector may have both positive and negative effects depending on the adherence of the 
banks to the existing laws and rules guiding the transfer of funds outside and inside the country. 
Although there is limited literature on how banks actually operate as facilitators of illicit financial 
flows in Africa, there is evidence that banks play an active role in facilitating capital flight from 
continent (Heggstad & Fjeldstad, 2010). In this study we find that increase in the financial sector 
rating6 reduces the illicit financial outflows although the results are insignificant in all the models. 
Trade rating and financial sector development can be classified as institutional assessment 
                                                          
6 Financial sector rating is an assessment of the structure of the financial sector and the policies and regulations that 
affect it on a scale of (1=low to 6=high). Data on financial sector rating were obtained from the World Bank Group, 
CPIA database (http://www.worldbank.org/ida).  
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variables. It is therefore evident from these results that robustness of intuitional policies is relevant 
for the control of illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan African countries. The development of 
a robust financial sector capable of tracking financial flows and as well as effective trade policies 
are essential for the achievement of the objective addressing illicit financial flows.   
   
Table 3: Estimates of illicit financial outflows (10 percent high and low) 
Dependent variable Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effect Random effect 
(Misinvoicing in trade) (US$ mil) (log) (US$ mil) (log) 
Corruption control -20.57 -0.0125** -20.48 -0.0125** 
 (13.46) (0.00555) (13.31) (0.00548) 
Political stability -45.22*** -0.0133** -44.26*** -0.0129** 
 (13.68) (0.00565) (13.55) (0.00558) 
Trade rating -381.8 -0.196 -421.8 -0.200 
 (311.3) (0.128) (308.2) (0.127) 
Financial sector rating -1.885 -0.000193 -2.646 -0.00106 
 (11.01) (0.00454) (10.79) (0.00444) 
Foreign direct investment  650.4*** 0.348*** 592.7*** 0.340*** 
 (105.4) (0.0435) (98.78) (0.0407) 
Exchange rate -323.9*** -0.118*** -339.9*** -0.118*** 
 (87.99) (0.0363) (86.48) (0.0356) 
Inflation (CPI) 135.5 0.136* 201.3 0.142** 
 (179.9) (0.0742) (171.1) (0.0705) 
Constant 2,629* 5.696*** 3,027** 5.736*** 
 (1,378) (0.568) (1,337) (0.551) 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
R-squared 0.283 0.335 0.2732 0.3339 
Wald chi2(1) ---- ---- 110.50 147.38 
Prob > chi2 ---- ---- 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test ---- ---- 3.04 1.36 
Prob > chi2 ---- ---- 0.8812 0.9868 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition to trade rating, and financial sector rating, the results show that an increase in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflow has a positive effect on illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A percentage increase in FDI increases illicit financial outflows (10 percent high) by 33 
percent (US$ 687.8 million). For the 10 percent low, the estimates are 35.5 percent (US$ 497.7 
million) while those for the average of the 10 percent high and 10 percent low are 34 percent (US$ 
592.7 million). In this study, we considered only FDI inflows and not the net because the inflows 
are expected to generate the capital or funds that the investors may expatriate illegally outside their 
countries of operation. Including the outflow or the net flow will amount to double counting since 
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the outflows may also contain some element of illicit outflows. In fact, our findings on the percent 
increase in illicit financial outflows fall within the range of 31 to 40 percentage increase in capital 
flight as observed by (Kant, 1996).  
 
Table 4: Illicit financial outflow due leakage in BOP (10 percent high) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It is also observed that an increase in inflation (measured by the consumer price index) is associated 
with an increase in illicit financial outflows in Sub-Saharan African countries. Inflation increases 
illicit financial outflows by an average of 14 percent which translates into an amount of about US$ 
201 million. This result is intuitively acceptable and expected in the sense that high inflation 
signals high interest rate (due to the positive association between the two variables) and 
consequently, a sign of unfavourable investment environment.  This may serve as a motivation for 
risk averse investors to engage in illicit financial outflows. Contrary to the effect of inflation, 
higher exchange rate appears to reduce illicit financial outflows. Observe from Table 3 that at 1 
percent level of significance, a percentage increase in the exchange rate reduces illicit outflows 
Dependent variable Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effect Random effect 
Illicit financial outflows (US$ mil) (log) (US$ mil) (log) 
Corruption control -32.79*** -0.00931 -32.23*** -0.00943 
 (12.09) (0.00737) (11.95) (0.00728) 
Political stability -48.93*** -0.0311*** -48.13*** -0.0304*** 
 (12.71) (0.00775) (12.53) (0.00764) 
Trade rating -23.06 -0.189 -34.67 -0.195 
 (304.6) (0.186) (299.2) (0.183) 
Financial sector rating -8.835 -0.000119 -6.618 0.000316 
 (9.269) (0.00565) (9.046) (0.00553) 
Foreign direct investment 346.7*** 0.287*** 339.5*** 0.287*** 
 (114.2) (0.0696) (109.1) (0.0671) 
Exchange rate -843.8*** -0.291*** -839.1*** -0.288*** 
 (115.1) (0.0702) (114.0) (0.0695) 
Inflation (CPI) 92.67 -0.122 139.1 -0.108 
 (211.6) (0.129) (198.3) (0.123) 
Constant 6,496*** 7.801*** 6,416*** 7.761*** 
 (1,357) (0.827) (1,313) (0.808) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.360 0.285 0.2803 0.2804 
F-statistic/Wald chi2(1) 20.05 14.24 178.81 101.54 
Prob > F/Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test ------ ------ 1.75 0.50 
Prob>chi2 ------ ------ 0.9724 0.9994 
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(10 percent high and 10 percent low) by 11.8 percent (US$ 339.9 million). Similar significantly 
negative associations are observed for the 10 percent low and 10 percent high of illicit financial 
outflows in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
Table 5: Illicit financial outflow due leakage in BOP (10 percent low) 
Dependent variable Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Random effect 
Illicit financial outflows (US$ mil) (log) (US$ mil) (log) 
Corruption control -3.706* -0.00204 -3.664* -0.00211 
 (2.008) (0.00580) (2.004) (0.00572) 
Political stability -10.67*** -0.0262*** -10.39*** -0.0259*** 
 (2.110) (0.00610) (2.103) (0.00600) 
Trade rating -83.08 -0.372** -93.26* -0.379*** 
 (50.59) (0.146) (50.28) (0.144) 
Financial sector rating -1.298 -0.00164 -1.123 -0.00150 
 (1.539) (0.00445) (1.524) (0.00435) 
Foreign direct investment 115.9*** 0.298*** 108.3*** 0.293*** 
 (18.96) (0.0548) (18.50) (0.0527) 
Exchange rate -103.1*** -0.160*** -102.7*** -0.159*** 
 (19.12) (0.0553) (19.11) (0.0546) 
Inflation (CPI) -75.69** -0.191* -59.31* -0.181* 
 (35.14) (0.102) (33.82) (0.0964) 
Constant 1,152*** 6.624*** 1,188*** 6.642*** 
 (225.4) (0.651) (222.7) (0.635) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.423 0.323 0.4017 0.3196 
F-statistic/Wald chi2(1) 26.18 17.03 178.81 122.18 
Prob > F/Prob>chi2 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test ------ ------ 11.25 0.25 
Prob>chi2 ------ ------ 0.1279 0.9999 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to misinvoicing in merchandise trade, the results on leakages in the balance of payments 
(see Table 4) show that both political stability and corruption control have negative effects. 
Holding all other variables constant, an increase in the percentile rank of a country’s corruption 
control by 1 reduces illicit financial outflows by US$ 3.664 million (0.00943 percent) while the 
effect of political stability is US$10.39 (0.0304 percent). In Tables 5 (10 percent low) and 6 
(average of 10 percent low and 10 percent high) the effects are US$ 3.664 million and US$ 17.93 
million respectively. Compared to the misinvoicing in merchandise trade, the effect of leakages in 
balance payment are lower. This confirms the claim by Global Financial Integrity (2017) that trade 
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misinvoicing is the primary measurable means by which organisations and individuals shift funds 
in and out of developing countries illicitly. 
 
Table 6: Illicit financial outflow due leakage in BOP (10 percent low) 
Dependent variable  
Illicit financial outflows 
Fixed effect Random effect Fixed effect Random effect 
(Leakages in BOP) (US$ mil) (log) (US$ mil) (log) 
Corruption control -18.25*** -0.00799 -17.93*** -0.00803 
 (6.758) (0.00671) (6.694) (0.00662) 
Political stability -29.80*** -0.0288*** -29.20*** -0.0285*** 
 (7.103) (0.00706) (7.017) (0.00695) 
Trade rating -53.07 -0.244 -66.26 -0.246 
 (170.3) (0.169) (167.6) (0.166) 
Financial sector rating -5.067 -0.000534 -3.826 -0.000257 
 (5.180) (0.00515) (5.067) (0.00504) 
Foreign direct investment 231.3*** 0.279*** 222.2*** 0.281*** 
 (63.80) (0.0634) (61.11) (0.0612) 
Exchange rate -473.4*** -0.252*** -470.8*** -0.250*** 
 (64.35) (0.0639) (63.87) (0.0631) 
Inflation(CPI) 8.495 -0.130 43.31 -0.126 
 (118.3) (0.118) (111.0) (0.112) 
Constant 3,824*** 7.459*** 3,811*** 7.427*** 
 (758.5) (0.754) (735.7) (0.737) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.385 0.299 0.3778 0.2969 
F-statistic/Wald chi2(1) 22.35 15.24 157.29 109.78 
Prob > F/Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman test ------ ------ 2.42 0.17 
Prob>chi2 ------ ------ 0.9333 1.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We observe from the estimates in Tables 4, 5 and 6 that the intuitions signs are the same as those 
observed for the misinvoicing in merchandise trade although the magnitude of the effects are 
lower. Unlike the models for misinvoicing in merchandise trade, inflation appears to have a 
negative relationship with leakages in leakages in balance of payment. Our results are in contrast 
to those obtained by Le and Rishi (2006) who found positive relationship between inflation and 
capital out flight. These differences in direction of relationship could be due to a number of direct 
and indirect factors including the method of computing the leakages and the implication of 
inflation for trade balance which consequently influence the leakages. According to the Global 
Financial Integrity (2017), leakages from the balance of payments are the Net Errors and 
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Omissions (NEO) term in the International Monetary Fund’s  (IMF) Balance of Payments Statistics 
(BOP) database. If in the course of computing the leakages, there are missing values for NEO in 
the BOP database, they attempt to fill the gaps with net errors and omissions data from various 
IMF country reports. This and many other factors may contribute to the observed negative effect. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article builds on the pioneering contribution to the literature from various single country case 
studies on the determinants of capital flight. The role of institutions in combatting capital flight is 
well established in the literature. This article broadens the scope of the discourse through 
examining a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries and focusing on the role of misinvoicing as a 
proxy for capital flight in this discourse. We found that the importance of political stability which 
was highlighted in several country level case studies holds at a continental level, too. It is found 
that a unit increase in political stability reduces capital flight in the form of merchandise trade 
misinvoicing by an average of $20.5 million, while better corruption control reduces capital flight 
by an average of $44.3 million. In contrast to Gankou et al.’s (2016:65) finding that there is no 
significant link between FDI inflows and illicit outflows, we do find that increased FDI increases 
illicit capital outflows. The results furthermore show that high trade rating, financial sector rating 
and exchange rates reduce illicit financial outflows while increase in foreign direct investment and 
inflation increase illicit financial outflow.  
 
The recommendation flowing from the results is unambiguous. Governments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries must ensure that institutions responsible for fighting corruption and enhancing 
stable governance are well empowered and given the needed resources to work effectively to 
reduce corruption to the barest minimum. More than lip service to good institutions is vital if the 
continent is to achieve the Agenda 2063 goals of a transformed African continent within the next 
50 years. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics of the variables of interest 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Misinvoicing (10% high) 370 1788.42 4518.037 0.5392 29226.85 
Misinvoicing (10% low) 370 937.067 3300.623 10.24 26744.9 
Misinvoicing (average of low & high) 370 1357.74 3717.279 0.3898 26734.89 
Leakages in BOP (10% high) 290 1297.76 3300.901 0.0000 28469.21 
Leakages in BOP (10% low) 290 337.71 579.4209 0.0000 4551.055 
Leakages in BOP (average of low & high)  290 817.736 1883.523 0.0000 15345.59 
Corruption control (percentile rank) 370 28.4941 19.0119 0.9479 79.8077 
Political stability (percentile rank) 370 28.8782 19.5051 0.9479 80.6763 
Trade rating 370 3.6332 0.6997 0.0000 4.5000 
Financial sector rating 370 3.9885 17.3322 0.0000 305.000 
Foreign direct investment  370 5.7039 1.5864 2.2460 9.0966 
Exchange rate 370 5.6863 2.3301 2.3903 22.6288 
Inflation (CPI, percent) 370 1.9736 1.1732 -2.5842 10.1028 
 
 
 
Table A2: Illicit outflows (average 10% high & 10% low) by countries (2005-2014)  
Country        Misinvoicing Leakages Country Misinvoicing Leakages  
Angola 819.1008 -------- Kenya 236.6341 ---------- 
Benin 180.8223 --------- Lesotho 151.9863 130.8656 
Burkina Faso 596.1007 586.3589 Liberia 876.0241 707.7891 
Burundi 94.9463 55.8904 Madagascar 320.0328 235.7361 
Cabo Verde 46.2436 10.31509 Malawi 478.7565 415.8589 
Cameroon 530.5648 500.6716 Mali 396.5497 317.8178 
Central African Republic 29.7536 --------- Mauritania 131.6396 ---------- 
Chad 964.9859 867.3369 Mozambique 237.4515 181.9227   
Comoros 44.2375 43.30408 Niger 131.2475 91.80613 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 156.8112 --------- Nigeria 17855.95 1750.675 
Congo, Republic of 1071.821 1033.868 Rwanda 173.1927 161.1524 
Cote d'Ivoire 1613.615 1576.626 Senegal 576.19 553.652 
Eritrea 33.95 --------- Sierra Leone 156.8197 80.34997 
Ethiopia 2205.775 1637.046 Sudan 8905.085 8666.016 
Gambia, The 76.0940 33.41647 Tanzania 406.0419 28.53912 
Ghana 660.538 --------- Togo 1708.457 1705.434 
Guinea 364.4901 324.4069 Uganda 527.693 400.6542 
Guinea-Bissau 34.35414 27.57689 Zambia 552.5114 490.9071 
   Zimbabwe 429.853 ---------- 
 
